Articles Posted in DWI Cases

In a recent opinion from a New York court, the defendant’s request for the court to suppress his incriminating statements was denied. The defendant was charged with aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree, driving while intoxicated, operation with a suspended registration, and consumption of an alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle. On appeal, the defendant argued that his incriminating statements made to the officer at the scene should be suppressed because he made the statements involuntarily. The court disagreed, denying the defendant’s appeal.

Facts of the Case

According to the opinion, a police officer observed the defendant in his car stopped at a red light one evening. Once the light turned green, the defendant did not drive forward, and other cars began to honk for him to move. The officer approached the vehicle and observed that the defendant appeared to be sleeping in the driver’s seat. Once the officer banged on the window, the defendant awoke and the officer asked to see a license and registration. With bloodshot eyes, the defendant fumbled around in the car to look for his papers. In the meantime, another officer arrived at the scene, asked the defendant a few questions, then issued field sobriety tests. After failing all of the tests, the defendant was placed under arrest.

During the trial, the officer who conducted the field sobriety tests testified that he had received training at the police academy on how to recognize evidence of intoxication. Based on the officer’s training, he had reason to believe the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. The defendant had a “jerky pursuit”, swayed while trying to maintain balance, refused a breathalyzer, and smelled of alcohol. After the arrest, the officer found one bottle of vodka in the car.

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Recently, a New York appellate court issued an opinion in a DWI case involving a defendant who failed a sobriety test after a routine traffic stop. This case is an example of a court granting the defendant’s motion to suppress a breath test because of concerns of reliability while denying the defendant’s motion to suppress statements made voluntarily by the defendant.

The Facts of the Case

According to the opinion, two officers pulled over the defendant while the defendant was driving his vehicle on a parkway. The officers allege that they observed the defendant’s vehicle swerving over into another lane multiple times and followed the vehicle for at least one-quarter of a mile before stopping the car. The defendant was in the driver’s seat while someone else was in the passenger seat. The officers observed the defendant with bloodshot and watery eyes and an odor of alcohol coming from the defendant’s breath. After an officer asked the defendant for his license, the defendant instead only produced a New Jersey identification card that was not a license. The officer asked if the defendant had anything to drink tonight, and the defendant responded, “not too much.” The officer directed the defendant to exit the vehicle and observed the defendant sagging side to side. The Portable Breath Test (PBT) was administered twice to the defendant, showing that the defendant blew over the legal limit. The officer observed the defendant for only two minutes before administering the test and did not look into the defendant’s mouth first.

While being transported to the Intoxicated Driver Testing Unit, the officer asked about the defendant’s license, to which the defendant replied it was coming in the mail. After a long pause, the defendant stated that it “looks like I’m going to lose my license now.” The officers eventually gave the defendant his Miranda warnings and eventually concluded that the defendant had been driving while impaired by alcohol.

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Recently, a New York appellate court denied a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on voluntary consent. According to the opinion, the defendant was driving a car and was pulled over by an officer who was using his radar gun and observed the defendant driving 20 miles over the speed limit. When the officer asked for the defendant’s license and registration, the officer smelled alcohol and noticed that the defendant had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. The defendant admitted to the officer that he had drunk two beers, although the defendant later told another officer that he had nothing to drink before then admitting that he had two beers. The officers arrested the defendant and conducted a breath test at the police precinct. The defendant was found to have a blood alcohol content of at least .08 percent and was charged with two counts of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

The defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, and the lower court denied the motion after finding that the officer had probable cause to stop the car since the defendant was driving 70 mph, and also told the officers that he had two beers and appeared to have slurred speech. During the trial, the defendant contested for the first time the voluntariness of his consent to the breath test and moved to suppress the results of the test. The defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. The defendant appealed and argued that it was an error to deny his motion he made mid-trial to suppress the breath test results.

Under New York Law, a defendant may move to suppress the results of a breathalyzer by filing a motion within forty-five days after arraignment and before the trial starts. Also, the court must evaluate any pretrial motions filed outside of this 45-day time limit to determine whether the defendant could not reasonably have raised the issue within the time period. The appellate court explains that the defendant was aware of the facts surrounding the breath test but chose not to file the motion, even during a hearing where the trial court asked the defense counsel whether the defendant wanted to raise any suppression claims regarding the breath test. Additionally, the consent issue was to be determined by the court before trial and was not an issue that the defendant was entitled to litigate during the trial without previously making a motion to suppress. Thus, the appellate court denied the defendant’s appeal on the motion to suppress and affirmed the defendant’s conviction. This case highlights the importance of having an experienced criminal defense attorney who can help you navigate complicated New York laws to best  protect your rights at every stage of the process.

Earlier this month, a state appellate court issued an opinion in a New York DWI case involving a defendant who was sentenced to six months in jail after he failed to complete the terms of a plea agreement. The case is an example not only of the alternate resolutions that may be available for those facing DWI charges, but also the importance of meeting all conditions of the agreement.

The Facts of the Case

The defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated driving while intoxicated. However, through his attorney, the defendant negotiated an agreement by which the defendant would plead guilty to the lesser offense of driving while ability impaired as well as aggravated driving while intoxicated. However, if the defendant refrained from drinking alcohol and successfully completed a treatment program the prosecution and the court would allow him to withdraw his guilty plea to the aggravated DWI charge. However, if the defendant failed to adhere to the conditions of the plea, he would be found guilty of aggravated driving while intoxicated and could be sentenced to up to one year in jail.

As it turns out, the defendant failed several alcohol tests and missed a few test appointments. He also failed to enroll in a qualifying treatment program for financial reasons. The defendant asked the court for another chance, which the court granted him. However, within a few months, the defendant had missed or failed several alcohol tests. As a result, the court sentenced him to six months in jail, a $1,000 fine, and revoked his license for one year.

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Recently, a state appellate court issued an opinion in a New York DUI case requiring the court to assess the lower court’s decision to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress. In a pre-trial motion, the court suppressed evidence obtained by the arresting officer, finding that the officer lacked justification to stop the defendant. However, on appeal, that ruling was reversed.

The Facts of the Case

According to the court’s opinion, a police officer received a call reporting that the driver of a white Nissan was smoking marijuana while driving. The caller provided the license plate of the vehicle as well as its direction of travel. Oddly enough, the officer who received the call was actually driving right behind the white Nissan. The officer observed as the car’s wheels traveled over the curb and momentarily onto the sidewalk as it made a right turn.

The officer pulled over the defendant, who was driving the Nissan. Upon the officer’s approach, she noticed the smell of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. The defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated.

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Recently, a New York appellate court addressed a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on an unlawful search and seizure. According to the record, a Lieutenant observed a vehicle with its headlights and engine on, parked between gas pumps. The officer testified that he noticed the vehicle because he thought it was unusual for the car to be at the location while the gas station was closed. When he passed the vehicle, he noticed that the defendant was slumped forward over the steering wheel. He approached the defendant and banged on his window to check if he was okay. When the officer did not get a response, he opened the door and shook the defendant. During this time, the officer detected the smell of an alcoholic beverage and arrested the defendant for DWI.

The defendant pleaded guilty and then appealed the court’s judgment based on a constitutional violation. The defendant argued that the Lieutenant did not have probable cause to open the car’s door and lean inside. He asserted that these actions amounted to an unlawful search.

Under New York law, police officers may approach a stationary vehicle to request information in situations where there is “objective, credible reason” for doing so. The law does not provide a clear definition of what constitutes an “objective, credible reason.” Determining whether an action meets this standard requires the court to balance the government’s interest against an individual’s right to security and privacy. Courts often cite public policy and safety when evaluating the lawfulness of an officer’s conduct. However, if police officers approach with an accusatory mindset, they need to justify their approach with suspicion of wrongdoing.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides individuals from unreasonable searches or seizures. New York criminal defendants who believe that they were the subject of an unreasonable search or seizure should contact an attorney to discuss their rights and remedies. This amendment requires law enforcement officials to have probable cause before stopping or searching an individual. The law defines probable cause as a reasonable belief that a crime is underway or has taken place.

The laws surrounding probable cause are often vague and allow law enforcement a great deal of discretion in determining whether a stop is appropriate. While law enforcement maintains this discretionary power, they must still abide by the law. After an officer stops a defendant, they maintain a limited right to search the vehicle and seize evidence. Officers may seize items that are in plain sight without a warrant. Defendants subject to an unlawful stop may file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the detention.

In cases involving DWI arrests, police may use evidence of a driver’s erratic driving and speeding as probable cause to stop the driver. Further, evidence of failed sobriety field tests and breathalyzer results may be probable cause for the driver’s arrest. For instance, recently, a New York driver was charged with DWI, making an unsafe lane change, and driving below the minimum speed. Amongst other things, the driver moved to suppress all of her statements and the results of a breathalyzer test. She argued that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest her.

After being convicted of a New York DWI offense, the court will often sentence the defendant to a period of probation. When the court puts someone on probation, it may add certain conditions to the defendant’s probation. If a defendant fails to comply with these conditions, it may constitute a violation of their probation, after which the court can then re-sentence the defendant.

In a recent decision issued by a state appellate court, the issue of whether the defendant’s actions violated the terms of his probation was at issue. According to the court, the defendant was convicted of a drunk driving offense and placed on probation. As a condition of his probation, the court ordered the defendant to install an ignition interlock device on any vehicle he planned on driving. The court also included a condition that the defendant was to allow probation officers to enter and inspect his home.

Evidently, the defendant’s probation officer visited the defendant’s home, asking to come inside to inspect the location. The defendant did not allow the probation officer to come inside. It was also discovered that the defendant had not installed an ignition interlock device on his ex-wife’s car, which he regularly used. The defendant was found in violation of his probation, the trial judge revoked probation and sentenced the defendant to a term of incarceration.

When someone is arrested for a New York DWI offense, there are often two simultaneous proceedings. The first is the criminal trial, which can result in a conviction for driving while intoxicated. The facing criminal prosecutions are entitled to heightened constitutional protections, and these offenses must be supported by evidence establishing the defendant committed the crime “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The second proceeding is administrative in nature and deals with the suspension of the driver’s operating license. Under the New York prompt suspension law, the government suspends the driving privileges of anyone who is arrested for a DWI offense pending the outcome of the case. However, because the suspension of driving privileges impacts a person’s rights, in 1996, New York courts agreed that there must be a hearing before someone’s license is suspended. This is referred to as a Pringle hearing, named after the case in which the court outlined the need for the hearing.

In a recent case, a court was presented with the question of whether a defendant’s driver’s license could be suspended after he was arrested for drunk driving on his own property. According to the court’s opinion, the defendant was driving on a road called “Palisade Place,” which was on his own property. Palisade place was a gravel road that is not maintained by the city; the defendant is solely responsible for the road’s maintenance. However, Palisade Place provides access to the defendant’s home, as well as one other residence. At the time of his arrest, the defendant’s blood-alcohol content was .24—three times the legal limit.

When the State, such as New York, brings charges against someone, the prosecutor overseeing the case will typically do whatever they can to make obtaining a conviction easier. Among the many tactics prosecutors use to do this is to join cases together so they are tried in a single proceeding. While prosecutors cannot join two cases together solely because it makes a defendant look bad, that is essentially what they are doing. Generally, cases that stem from separate arrests, or were allegedly committed on different days are initiated as separate trials as a default. Under certain circumstances, the prosecution can then file a motion to consolidate the two cases. It is almost always against a defendant’s interest to consolidate cases, provided they are planning on fighting the cases. A recent appellate decision in a New York DWI case illustrates the standards courts use when assessing whether the joinder of two cases is appropriate.

The Facts of the Case

According to the court’s opinion, on September 4, 2011, a person was run over on the Hudson Parkway. Video footage of the accident showed that it was a dark Acura that hit the victim. The defendant was the owner of the Acura. Months later, in January 2012, police pulled the defendant over for going 85mph in a 50mph zone while weaving in and out of traffic. The defendant was arrested for a New York DWI offense.

The two cases were joined, and the officer who arrested the defendant for the DWI offense was permitted to testify that he recognized the defendant from the videos taken the night of the September 2011 accident.
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